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This paper addresses the relationship between financial crises associated with foreign 
capital flows on the one hand and the wellbeing of children in emerging market countries 
on the other.  The literature on child welfare in crises suggests that the level of 
employment and labour incomes are the key linkage, because these constitute the major 
component of the incomes of poor families and affect the division of labour within the 
household upon which child welfare depends.  A simple analytical model of labour 
markets illustrates the linkage between corporate sector contraction under financial 
crisis and the incomes of the poor in the urban informal and rural sectors.  This insight 
leads to recommendations for the reconsideration of capital controls and exchange rate 
management in merging markets as means of employment stabilisation (in the spirit of 
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The printing shop closed without warning and her father was thrown out 
of work, turning Rini’s world upside down. With the future so 
uncertain, Rini’s parents worried about not being able to afford to send 
her to school. 
 







A central characteristic of the world in the twenty-first century is the increasingly free 
movement of merchandise and capital across national boundaries, with all countries now 
bound together by global markets. The rapid growth of private capital flows over the past 
decade presents an opportunity for poor countries to access a global pool of savings, 
technology and management skills; but at the same time it presents new policy challenges 
in terms of securing sustainable development and poverty reduction.  The linkages 
between financial globalisation in general – and financial crises in emerging markets in 
particular – and the well being of children in developing countries are thus always 
complex and often ambiguous.   
 
This paper focuses on the analysis of the effect of financial crises on labour markets, the 
incomes of poor families, and the consequences for child wellbeing.  In Section 2, this 
paper identifies the main issues in financial crisis analysis that are relevant to this 
discussion. These are the origins of financial integration and instability; the scale of the 
financial collapses and their wage/employment consequences; and the nature of the 
recovery process. In Section 3 the literature on the effect on children of financial crises is 
briefly reviewed, focussing on the consequences of labour market stress on the family 
itself – as well as the consequent impacts on health and education. A central premise of 
this argument is that labour incomes are the main determinant of poor families’ welfare 
as these determine not only nutrition and housing status but also in effect access to health 
and education in countries where public services do not adequately extend to the poor. 
Section 4 attempts to specify two key transmission mechanisms from financial crises to 
child wellbeing: the direct effect of capital surges on employment and wages in the 
‘modern’ sector of the economy; and the indirect effect on the urban and rural ‘informal’ 
sectors where poor households (and thus vulnerable children) are located.  Finally, in 
Section 5, the implications of these effects on labour markets - and the longer-term 
consequences of lost growth and fiscal debt on child welfare over a lifetime - for the 















2. Financial Integration,  Stability and Poverty 
 
The rising supply of private capital from developed countries to developing countries (or 
more precisely, the rising demand for emerging market assets) is mainly due to the scale 
and scope of modern production systems that has led to the rise of ‘multinational’ 
corporations which can locate and articulate their activities on a global basis so as to 
source local and overseas markets.  However, the increasing complexity and 
competitiveness of financial markets in developed countries themselves have led to a 
demand for high-yield risky assets combined with a more sophisticated approach to the 
management of that risk. This has increased the willingness to invest in emerging market 
assets that are both liquid and possess a low covariance with the rest of the portfolio. This 
process has generated international bond, equity and credit markets of considerable size; 
markets which have facilitated by advances in telecommunications and information 
technology.  
 
The supply of suitable financial assets for foreign investors to acquire has also increased 
markedly due to the process of market liberalisation in developing countries. The 
combination of difficulties in long-term international bank borrowing, domestic interest 
rate liberalisation and strict monetary policies has led to a dramatic expansion of the 
government bond market. Finally, the opening and expansion of domestic securities 
markets led by privatisation flotations has encouraged domestic firms to raise funds by 
issuing shares and bills. The ability to access international capital markets has been 
enhanced by improved telecommunications technology and changes in these markets 
themselves. International bond issues by both governments and large firms from 
developing countries have become routine; while the spread of depository receipts has 
permitted the quotation of developing country equities on the main global markets.  
 
However, international capital markets suffer from a number of systemic inefficiencies 
which lead to ‘market failure’ – that is a situation where otherwise profitable investments 
cannot find finance.  In particular, a shift in external market sentiment can cause a sudden 
(possibly excessive) reversal in the both risk appetite and perception of uncertain future 
returns, destabilising the economy. The integration of capital markets has also increased 
the ease by which nationals of developing countries can move their assets abroad.  Of 
course, portfolio diversification can be micro-economically efficient in itself, and indeed 
many developing country companies have become to emerge as ‘southern multinationals’ 
in their own right, while intra-regional investment flows are becoming more important. 













for concern because it implies potential investment foregone – particularly in crisis 
situations.  
 
With an open capital account, the cycle of foreign capital flows tends to be highly pro-
cyclical with countries’ economic conditions, rather than acting to stabilise the economy. 
This model also encourages pro-cyclical government policy – increased spending in 
booms and cutbacks during recessionary outflow periods – and hence increased 
macroeconomic volatility. The management of capital inflows has costs in terms of 
increased instability of government finances and the macroeconomy more generally, and 
also unstable real exchange rates if sterilisation is adopted.  The result of this 
overshooting may be the widespread failure of corporate and banking sector institutions: 
indiscriminate failures which destroy sound as well as unsound banks and corporations 
may jeopardise the institutional basis of a future economic recovery.  
 
As Table 1 below indicates, these shocks all led to a considerable decline in average 
household consumption in leading emerging markets, equivalent to more than 10 percent 
in a single year in many cases. However, recovery of consimption levels was also 
relatively rapid in most cases, which has generated some optimism among international 
financial institutions.    
 
Table 1 Real Per Capita Household Consumption in Some Crisis Countries 
 
  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
           
Indonesi
a 
100.0  108.0  114.6  104.4  105.7  107.2 
Korea  100.0  106.1  108.8  95.0  104.1  110.7 
Malaysia 100.0  104.1  105.7  91.3  91.6  101.2 
Thailand 100.0  105.6  103.2  89.2  90.3  92.9 
Argentin
a 
100.0  104.6  111.5  113.5  109.1  109.0 
Brazil  100.0  101.7  103.2  101.9  100.2  102.6 
Chile  100.0  107.8  114.9  118.0  112.5  118.9 
             
  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997 
             
Mexico  100.0  98.7  102.1  90.8  91.6  94.1 
Source: IMF and Consensus Economics 













However, these financials shocks also have serious consequences for corporate finance 
and thus on productive investment and sustainable employment. This problem is 
exacerbated in many developing countries by the especially weak position of small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs). Affiliates of foreign multinationals by their very nature are 
largely exempt from local financing constraints. Large domestic companies or groups 
generally have preferential access to bank credit, and are thus relatively protected from 
capital market fluctuations.  SMEs are the most vulnerable then to capital outflow-
induced shifts in credit availability, and the concomitant impact on the poor can be 
strongly negative. 
 
Financial crises in a number of leading emerging markets in the latter half of the 1990s 
and early 2000s caused widespread concern about the premature liberalisation of 
financial sectors in developing countries, before a solvent fiscal structure, a robust 
regulatory system and a competitive business sector had been built up. In a number of 
cases large inflows of short-term funds led to overheating of the domestic economy, 
excessive credit expansion (and a decline in savings rates), real estate bubbles and over-
valuation of the exchange rate. The large outflows of funds once the cycle turned, the 
collapse of investment and output, the rise of unemployment and the fiscal retrenchment; 
have had serious consequences for poverty and development and tend to create 
‘contagion’ for neighbouring countries.  
 
In a recent survey Cobham (2000) sets out a basic framework for examining the linkages 
between capital account liberalisation and poverty. Capital account liberalisation is seen 
to act at a general level, through the effects on overall growth and on macroeconomic 
instability; and more specifically, through the effects on poverty of changes in 
government budgets, access to credit and industrial performance.  First, that it remains to 
be seen whether the overall growth impact of capital account liberalisation is positive, 
and the case in lower-income countries is particularly weak. There is no evidence of 
positive growth effects. Second, that the benefits accrue primarily to international 
financial markets and domestic capital holders, i.e. the relatively wealthy, but eventually 
to the poorer through improved investment quality (and hence – at least potentially – 
employment). Third, the impact on investment quantity, however, which may be more 
significant for employment, is unproven; there appears to be no long-term positive 
impact, although possibly a one-time, short-term boom in investment may occur. Fourth, 
there is a danger that the impact of increased macroeconomic instability – which has been 
shown to have damaging negative effects on both the level and quality of investment – 
will outweigh these benefits and lead ultimately to reduced employment. Fifth, while the 
most obvious winners are likely to be located in urban areas, with easy access to financial 













provided rural areas have clear negative consequences for agricultural industry and 
poverty. 
 
Cobham (2000) reveals that the available literature shows that government revenues are 
affected by capital account liberalisation through three channels: the imposition of 
international market discipline, the priorities of the IMF in crisis and post-crisis 
stabilisation packages, and the changing levels of tax revenue. The first two are negative 
– at least in the short to medium term – while the third may have differing effects, 
depending on the extent of possible increases in capital flight and the (output-related) tax 
base.  Government budgets are reduced then, with two effects of particular importance 
for the poor.  Firstly, social spending will suffer in real terms if not relative to the total 
budget, and the longer-term impact of reduced health and education provision falls 
particularly on the poorest. Secondly, longer-term spending – i.e. infrastructure 
investment programs – may be significantly cut, and as well as limiting the country’s 
development directly the resulting instability will also reduce the extent to which private 
investment can be crowded in. The possibility of greater government spending on 
building up reserves and other measures to protect the currency will compound these 
effects. 
 
As Table 2 indicates, the impact of financial crises on investment has been much more 
serious than that on household consumption, which implies in turn that the long-term 
capacity to generate growth and formal sector employment has not recovered.  
 
Table 2: Gross Fixed Investment in Some Crisis Countries 
 
  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
Index 1995=100         
Indonesi
a 
100.5  109.1  73.1  58.6  64.4 
Korea  107.3  104.9  82.7  86.1  97.1 
Malaysia 108.2  118.2  67.3  63.4  75.0 
Thailand 107.4  84.1  46.9  44.7  48.0 
Argentin
a 
108.9  128.2  136.5  119.0  112.5 
Brazil  101.2  110.6  109.8  101.4  107.9 
Chile  108.9  121.4  126.4  104.4  108.9 
           
  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997 
Mexico  98.8  107.1  76.0  88.5  107.1 














There is no reliable source of employment data for crisis countries, and the evidence of 
on modern sector wages (see Table 3 below) is somewhat fragmentary, indicating that 
wages recover in some cases but remain depressed in others. However, Diven (1999) 
finds that labour shares of national income fall sharply during financial crises: 
Perhaps because labour is less mobile than capital, it ends up being forced to bear a large 
share of these asset losses (in the sense of transferring part of its income to another 
group). There is strong evidence of this happening. Crises are resolved when workers end 
up bearing large costs that resemble bailouts of (financial) capital. We estimates that the 
total losses to labour, from the beginning to the end of the crisis, amount on average to 20 
percentage points of GDP”.  
 
Table 3 Real Wage Levels in Some Crisis Countries 
 
 
  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
           
Indonesi
a 
           
Korea  100.0  107.3  108.1  96.6  110.1  117.2 
Malaysia            
Thailand            
Argentin
a 
100.0  100.4  97.3  96.9  96.2   
Brazil  100.0  102.7  105.5  108.3  92.4  94.4 
Chile  100.0  105.2  108.0  111.5  115.4  116.2 
             
  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997 
             
Mexico  100.0  108.9  113.0  86.6  79.9  83.3 
 
 
Source: IMF and Consensus Economics 
 
 
Recovery of output from the immediate post-crisis level is almost complete in most 
countries in cris during the 1990s; but the longer economic and social consequences may 
be considerable. This is due to the large and sudden redistribution of assets and liabilities 
between domestic and foreign agents, between the public and private sectors, and 
between the rich and poor.  This redistribution clearly depends on the form that the rescue 













by the public sector in the form of new external borrowing and the taking over of bad 
loan books of domestic banks long. This in turn implies future fiscal retrenchment with 
inevitable social consequences. 
 
Much of the problem of addressing this issue arises from the absence of a clear and 
agreed framework for analysing the effect of macro-financial shocks on poverty, and thus 
child wellbeing.  Bourguinon (1991) is a notable exception: he and his colleagues 
constructed a generic CGEM framework that includes both financial markets and poverty 
indicators, comparing fiscal and exchange-rate adjustment to external shocks. This 
‘maquette’ was applied to the cases of Ivory Coast, Morocco, Ecuador, Indonesia and 
Malaysia. The poverty effects of adjustment programmes are shown to be inevitably 
negative in the short run, but to be positive in the longer run insofar as private investment 
accelerates. As we have seen, this latter problem is particularly acute in the case of 
financial shocks.  
 
The labour market is somewhat crudely modelled in thse models, and wage stickiness 
exacerbates poverty by reducing employment through the price-elasticity of the demand 
for labour. None the les, these models do show that the poverty effect of external shocks 
depends to a great extent on the nature of the macroeconomic policy response. In 
particular, the adjustment can take the form of a relative price shift (ie devaluation) or a 
demand reduction (eg fiscal contraction) and the poverty effect depends upon the balance 
of private and public expenditure in the wellbeing of the poor – in other words, on the 
particular country case.  None the less, it is very clear from these models that fianncial 
liberalisation exacerbates the effect of adjustment on the poor, because of the shift of 
private wealth out of domestic investment (which creates employment) into foreign assets 
– that is, ‘capital flight’ – reflecting the relative immobility of labour.  
 
Vos and de Yong (2001) is one of the few recent studies to explicitly isolate the through 
‘microsimulations’ the effect of each of the main determinants of poverty and inequality 
and associate these with the process of inancial liberalisation.  They model the 
Ecuadorian fianncial crisis of the late 1990s in some detail and refer specifically to the 
labour market effects on income distribution and poverty.  The underlying trend under 
trade and fianncial liberalisation is one of rising earnings differentials between skilled 
and unskilled workers - that is, between employment in the modern corporate sector on 
the one hand and employment (or under-employment) in the urban informal sector and 
the rural sector on the other.  However, “during the crisis periods the pushing of workers 
into informal self-employed activities was more critical in explaining the rise in 
inequality”. In particular, the changing emplyment structure mainly eplains the shifts in 













change in the average remuneration explains most of the increase in poverty incidence in 
the recession and crisis periods, and of its reduction during the liberalisation period.”  
 
In sum, the labour market effects of financial crises are cleraly central to undertanding 
the poverty effects of fianncial crises. 
 
 
3. Child Wellbeing under Financial Instability  
 
The World Bank (2000a) in the Global Economic Prospects and the Developing 
Countries devotes a whole chapter to ‘External Shocks, Financial Crises, and Poverty and 
Developing Countries’ that concludes somewhat optimistically that recovery has been 
rapid in cases where countries have pursued ‘sound policies’. Targeted social support in 
the form of ‘safety nets’ has worked well. In particular, it asserts that health and 
education have not suffered as a share of government expenditures and have even 
increased in some cases; though naturally per capita spend has declined with GDP and 
fiscal retrenchment. A similarly optimistic story emerges from Indonesian village-level 
data in Cameron (2000), which seems to suggest that sectoral experience may differ, 
particularly where large real devaluations affect traded good producers positively.   
 
This contrasts rather sharply with the more recent World Bank (2000b) view in WDR 
2000/01: Attacking Poverty that that “boom and bust economic cycles prevent countries 
from consolidating progress in poverty reduction, because it is the poorest who are most 
vulnerable to these swings”. In the most recent Global Development Finance (2001) the 
Bank takes a more cautious position on capital account liberalisation, hopefully due to the 
impact on the poor.   
 
Although the literature on child poverty in developing countries is extensive, rigorous 
studies of the effect of financial crises is scarce. Bell and Reich (1988) collect a number 
of papers on health, nutrition and economic crises which make the point that as most 
health and nutrition delivery is by women, the impact of crises on mothers and older 
sisters will be transmitted to children. In particular, if labour market disruption and low 
incomes force women to work more away from home, then child care in all its forms will 
suffer – even though mothers tend to spend a larger proportion of their income (and time) 
on their children than fathers do. 
 
Moreover, even though the initial impact of financial crises on children may be reversed 
as the economy recovers relatively quickly, as Myers (1992) points out the failure to 
invest in early childhood as having a longer-run impact on adult well-being and income 













confirm this key point empirically in their study of malnourished children in Chile during 
the 1970s, which they aptly termed “an example of disinvestment in human capital’.  
Againt this, it should be remembered that as Deaton and Paxson (1997) point out, the 
conventional method of measuring household poverty is likely to overstate the incidence 
of poverty among children, and underestmate that on old people. 
 
In one of the few longtitudinal studies of health and child nutritional status at a time of 
economic structural adjustment Bijlmakers, Basset and Sanders (1998) conclude that in 
Zimbabwe during the mid-90s there was a diversification of income sources and 
(counter-intuitively) a decline in subsistence production. Safety nets did not reach the 
poor, and in any case household expenditure on health care, school fees and household 
durables were all cut. The effect on child welfare in general and stunting in particular was 
considerable despite the declared intention of both government and aid agencies to 
protect the poor. However, as Nieuwenhuys (1994) points out, the fact that children are 
forced onto the labour market in times of financial crises may not be as negative as it 
might appear. There is not a simple conflict between a child’s paid work and education: 
because children work anyway, but are usually unpaid, a chance to get monetary income 
increases their bargaining strength within the family, and their nutritional status is 
actually protected thereby. 
 
Turning to micro-evidence on the recent financial crises, much has been written on the 
social impact of the down-swing, particularly on the Indonesian poor, but unfortunately 
on the experience of recovery in more recent years. It is difficult to determine, therefore, 
how permanent the effects may be. Watkins (2000: 285-94) in a study for OXFAM 
addresses the effect of financial crises on education for the poor, which he identifies as 
the main transmission mechanism – exacerbating the negative impact of structural 
adjustment programmes in the previous decade. Enrolment rates fell in Indonesia by 3 
percent for primary and 11 percent for secondary schools. Rural primary enrolment fell 
more than urban, but the reverse was true at the secondary level. Real spending on 
education fell by more than a third in the two years after the crisis. The long-term 
consequences are serious because education has been the main factor in reducing poverty. 
Watkins contrasts the case of Thailand, where emergency school scholarships were 
provided through established channels during and after the crisis, making the impact on 
education far less than in Indonesia.  
 
Finally, Stalker (2000) argues in a study for UNICEF that the social impact of Krismon 
was particularly great on the health status of poor children because the public health 
system was based on primary clinics was thinly spread and very fragile. Between early 
1996 and early 1999 the proportion of population living below the poverty line rose from 













was hit hardest, and though rural sector suffered less, there were more people competing 
for same jobs. Official household surveys found that between 1997 and 1998 per capita 
household expenditure fell nationally by 24 percent: 34 percent in urban areas and 13 
percent in rural.  Forced sales of assets mean that the real income effect may be even 
greater. But children were not generally withdrawn from school. However, the proportion 
of children using government health facilities fell from 26 to 20 percent, due to not 
having money for fees and the deteriorating service and lack of drugs. Attendance by 
children under five down from 47 to 28 percent. The key problem appears to be in the 
community clinics, where local volunteers (mainly women) withdrew in order to earn 
money elsewhere. Government safety nets worked fairly well in food and education, and 
though they could have been better targeted on the poor, broad coverage may have 
defused social tensions. There was much less success in maintaining health programmes 
or in creating new jobs. 
 
Stalker’s conclusion, however, underlines the problem of distinguishing the effects of the 
financial crisis as such (and by extension, financial globalisation) with the wider problem 
of under-development. 
 
Common sense tells us that [child poverty, homelessness, malnutrition etc] must have been 
exacerbated by Indonesia’s crisis. But it would be wrong to assume that these problems will 
automatically recede as the monetary situation improves. Macro-economic improvement has not 
trickled down to restore Indonesians to their pre-crisis standard of living. Even if it had, economic 
recovery alone would not be enough to tackle the unseen and under-estimated human 
vulnerability that existed long before the crisis. (op. cit. p. vii) 
 
Financial instability in general and financial crises in particular can place an excessive 
burden on poor and vulnerable members of society in emerging market economies. The 
poor are not in general the main beneficiaries of the upswing in an asset price boom, as 
employment and wages tend to rise in the sectors such as banking and construction 
requiring skills. However, if the subsequent downturn involves a sharp fall in aggregate 
output and severe fiscal retrenchment, vulnerable groups are likely to experience serious 
income decline.  Sustained poverty reduction requires long-term growth and substantial 
public investment in social infrastructure, both of which conditions are negatively 
affected by financial crises.    
 
The consequence of currency collapse for levels of output, and thus employment, can be 
dramatic. The result of large nominal devaluations, at least in the short term, has been a 
decline in imports (i.e. reduced absorption) rather than an increase in exports (i.e. 
resource reallocation); and thus of domestic economic activity. Real wages fall sharply, 













depreciated and the traded sector stimulated. The decline of public investment in crisis 
periods can have long-term employment consequences, while the effect of financial 
instability and business uncertainty on private investment can be even more serious. 
 
Short-term capital inflows, and the resultant macroeconomic instability, have a number of 
important consequences for domestic industry. What is particularly significant here is the 
asymmetric impact of increased levels of macroeconomic uncertainty on firms. In 
financial crises banks tend to restrict credit to all but preferential borrowers (e.g. large 
firms). The dominance of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) is greater in developing 
economies, where larger firms are fewer and SMEs provide much of the employment. 
Since smaller firms tend to more labour-intensive and less capital-intensive, their 
employment contribution is relatively greater and thus their credit starvation in financial 




4. The Transmission of Financial Shocks to Child Poverty 
 
Households are affected by real macroeconomic shocks through the level of employment 
and wages on the one hand, and the availability of government services and bank credit 
(particularly for residential construction and consumer durables purchases) on the other.  
To a great extent, therefore, the impact of short-term capital flows on households will 
reflect the consequence of the response of the fiscal and firms sectors to external shock.  
First, the negative effect of these flows on public investment stability, and thus on the 
effective provision of social infrastructure; leading to a reduced supply of and 
effectiveness in health and education services, public transport systems and urban 
services.  Second, the asymmetric effect of these flows on the volatility of corporate 
output, and thus on the level of current ‘formal sector’ employment and, through the level 
of investment on longer term employment.  Third, the negative effect of these flows on 
capital market and exchange rate volatility, and thus on the level of private investment; 
with long-term consequences for the level of sustainable employment and thus income 
distribution. 
 
However, the most significant negative consequence on welfare is probably - as in the 
case of trade liberalisation - felt through the long term consequences for private 
investment, because this (rather than low wage rates or even labour skilling) is the main 
source of sustainable long-term employment (FitzGerald and Perosino, 1999). None the 
less, the broader effect of capital flows on the real exchange rate is of considerable 













whole (including the small-scale sector) and the level of real wages through relative 
prices. 
  
The mechanics of this boom often take the form of banks extending consumer credit 
backed by the short-term capital inflows; rather than extending it to companies as in our 
earlier model. This boom is not sustainable, however, and to remain consistent with 
market expectations of solvency the current account should be closed again in the 
subsequent period and imports should fall sharply again even if the capital inflow is not 
reversed. 
  
In practice, halting an import-and-credit boom generated by short-term capital inflows is 
very difficult. This is partly for the technical reason that reducing credit levels to 
consumers implies rapid repayment of debt which cannot be achieved by selling the 
corresponding household assets (eg houses or consumer durables); and partly for the 
political reason that the euphoric sense of economic success is difficult to abandon. In 
consequence, it is not surprising that the authorities seek to sustain the boom in the hope 
that further short term capital inflows can be attracted. However, when foreign investors 
reach the conclusion that the deficit is unsustainable, the reverse process starts. Capital 
outflows require that the domestic economy generate a large surplus on the current 
account of the balance of payments. When drastic reductions in domestic demand have 
caused widespread bankruptcy and household distress, to borrow heavily from 
international financial institutions in order to - in effect - acquire the domestic assets of 
non-resident investors. 
 
The aggregate impact of these sudden shifts in corporate sector activity affect both wages 
and employment directly. This effect is modelled in Appendix A.1.  An outflow of capital 
forces wither a sharp decline in GDP as imports fall or a depreciation of the currency, 
which mitigates the import decline with an export stimulus.  Of course, most crises 
involve both these effects as the capital outflow both reduces liquidity to the domestic 
market and reduces the price of domestic currency assets. Real wages are also shown to 
be directly linked to the real exchange rate in Appendix A.1, a nominal devluation only 
becoming real if nominal wages do not move up proportionately.  There is thus a trade-
off between real wages and employment levels in the adjustment process. However this 
does not arise from the price elasticity of demand from labour, but rather from the impact 
of the external sector which drives the domestic macroeconomic equilibrium.    
 
In the case of a capital inflow, an active monetary policy would involve some domestic 
inflation in order to force up (ie devalue) the real exchange rate and allow output to rise, 
which may well be politically unattractive.  This may be the reason why in Latin America 













term capital inflow, due to the recent experience of high inflation. In Asia, with less 
inflationary experience, there is more willingness to allow domestic prices (and thus the 
real exchange rate) to adjust.  On the outflow of short capital, exactly the reverse 
situation should hold; but as nominal prices are more or less rigid downwards in practice, 
it is much more difficult devalue the real exchange rate than to revalue it, so that a forced 
reduction in output is much more likely.  In sum, an inflow followed by an equal outflow 
is likely to have an asymmetric character: the real exchange rate falling (ie appreciating) 
with the inflow, and output falling on the outflow. 
 
This analysis of the response of the real exchange rate and aggregate demand to short 
term capital inflows and outflows also reveals asymmetric implications for wages and 
employment. The real exchange rate rises on the inflow, but does not fall proportionately 
on an equal outflow; so that aggregate demand falls more on the outflow than it had risen 
on the inflow. To the extent that real wages will rise with the inflow but employment will 
remain the same.  With the outflow, real wages would not fall but employment would 
decline.  As a key problem of income distribution is the balance between the incomes of 
the employed and those of the un- (or under-) employed; fluctuations in external capital 
flows can be expected to have a negative effect on income distribution. 
 
The effect of the collapse of labour incomes in the corporate sector on the rest of the 
economy is the key to the welfare effect - this effect being transmitted through 
expenditures on goods and services from the urban informal sector, and from there out to 
the rural sector. Appendix A.2 shows how the structure of the labour force determines 
how the financial crisis impact on the corporte sector (with few if any poor households) is 
transmitted into the urban informal sector and the rural sector (where poor households are 
located) and thus poverty is worsened. The key insight here is that urban informal sector 
employmnet and incomes are determined by the expenditure of corporate sector 
employees. The effect on the urban poor of a change in the corporate wage rate is thus 
different from that of a change in corporate employment, even though the exenditure 
effect is similar, because the latter involves a change in competition in the informal 
labour market.  
 
Further, migration from rural to urban areas tends to equalise incomes at the margin; so 
that any shift in urban per capoita incomes will affect the migratory process and can even 
reverse it in a crisis. With sustained expansion of the corporate sector in a boom period, 
then both urban and rural incomes rise and poverty rises, even though a minority of 
migrants to urban areas get jobs in the corproate sector. When this mechanism is reversed 
in a financial crisis, poverty increases  in both rural and urban areas. 













The model shows that the effect on the rest of the economy of a corporate sector decline 
depends very much upon whether there is a decline in wages or a decline in employment. 
The latter is much more disruptive than the former on the rest of the economy, and to the 
extent that employment loss by the head of household has a more traumatic effect on 
children than the loss of income, then this finding has significant implications for child 
well-being. 
 
To get some idea of the relative magnitude of thes effects, the model results in Appendix 
A.3 can be calibrated with some parameter values characteristic of emerging market 
economies. A representative economy with a typical labour force distribution between the 
corporate and government sector (20 per cent), the urban informal sector (30 per cent) 
and the rural secotr (50 per cent) is illustrated in Table 4 below. As explained above, an 
adjustment of 10 per cent in the corproate sector activity level due to a finacial shock can 
be expressed either as a 10 per cent fall in employment or a 10 per cent cut in wage rates. 
In the first case, the employment decline in the corporate sector (keeping real wages 
steady) has a violent effect on urban informal employment (down 16 oercent)  as incomes 
fall and the newly unemployed enter the urbamn labour market driving wages down and 
forcing migration back to rural areas, where the workforce rises by 6 per cent and wages 
are laso forced down. In the second case, cutting corporate wages by 10 percent (but 
maintaining employment) reduces urban informal employment due to the reduction in 
demand for informal goods and services, but by less because there is no competiion in the 
urban labour market; and less workers are forced back to rural areas so wages there do 
not fall by so much.  In short, the poverty effects in the fiorst case are much greater than 
in the second case.   
 
Table 4: Poverty Effects of a 10 percent Cut in Corporate Employment or Wages 
  
    Corporate Sector  Urban Informal   Rural Sector 
Employment  -10%  -16%  +6%  10% Fall in Corporate 
Employment  Wages  -  -6%  -6% 
Employment  -  -6%  +4%  10 % Fall in Corporate 




















5. Financial Policies for Reducing Child Poverty 
 
The arguments and evidence set out above imply that employment and investment 
stability are the key to maintaining and improving child welfare in emerging market 
economies. This has significant consequences for the management of capital flows, 
exchange rate doctrine and international financial cooperation.   
 
First, both theory and experience indicate the desirability of scheduling capital account 
liberalisation after financial liberalisation. Allowing foreign investment in domestic 
financial markets and foreign borrowing by domestic banks and corporations calls for 
minimum levels of both market efficiency and institutional and regulatory capacity to 
safeguard stability.  In consequnce, many emerging market governments have begun to 
consider the re-imposition of capital controls as a means of insulating their economies 
from the potentially destabilising effects of short-term capital movements. These now 
controls tend to be ‘market based’ and range from taxes varying with asset maturity to 
prudential constraints foreign borrowing by domestic banks and firms. Article VIII of the 
IMF Articles of Agreement only requires member countries to avoid imposing 
restrictions on current account transactions, such as those related to trade in goods and 
services and the remittance of profits and dividends. Indeed, the OECD countries 
themselves only gradually dismantled controls on capital flows over several post-war 
decades.  
 
Second, the exchange rate affects both the level of domestic activity (and thus the 
employment level) and the real wage, and is thus a key determinant of the welfare of poor 
households and their children. A full float clearly leads to employment and wage 
instability when the economy experiences exogenous shocks; while hard pegs tend to 
lead to overvaluation and destabilising specualtive attacks. Some form of exchange rate 
management is unavoidable for small open economies with high trade coefficients and 
shallow domestic capital markets. Although it is clearly desirable to achieve both real 
wage and employment stability, the analysis in this paper indicates that both cannot be 
attained simultaneously so that if child welfare is the criterion, employment stability (and 
thus real exchange rate variability) may be preferable to real wage stability. 
 
Third, the international financial community must recognise the systemic problems faced 
by countries whose financial markets are still at an intermediate stage of development. 
Their financial systems require some protection from external shocks that might 
otherwise lead to excessive fluctuations in liquidity. As they are not sufficiently 
integrated to global markets to rely on permanent access to private financing, they must 
have flexible access to official financing for counter-cyclical borrowing in order to 













free to choose the exchange rate regime that they judge best for their circumstances, and 
international support should not be made conditional on the adoption of a particular 
regime.  Further, for any exchange rate regime to be sustainable for these economies with 
diversified trading and investment patterns, it is essential that G3 exchange rates (i.e. 
between the dollar, euro and yen) should not be too unstable.  
 
Fourth, emergency financial ‘rescue packages’ clearly need to be underpinned by strong 
social policies: providing safety nets without excessive fiscal strain and actions to make 
sure that the needs of the poor are given proper consideration. As the longer-term 
development of children can be harmed by household unemployment and loss of health 
and education access, even if only for a few years. Increased social and economic 
stability will not only help households cope with shocks and build the political consensus 
in support of government policy that prevents social conflict from worsening, and thus 
help restore private sector confidence more quickly.  
 
Fifth, creditors should thus accept greater public intervention in the economy for social 
protection during a financial crisis, so long as it is consistent with fiscal stability over the 
cycle as a whole, so as to maintain domestic investment and employment levels. These 
mechanisms may include public works schemes to create employment, maintenance of 
bank credit to small firms and the ‘ring fencing’ of fiscal expenditure on primary 
education and basic health systems. More long-term funding should also be made 
available from multilateral development banks to strengthen social infrastructure 
provision. 
 
Sixth, the international community must thus recognise that for the new International 
Financial Architecture to be viable, it must be underpinned by sound social protection 
systems in order to both protect vulnerable groups – above all children - in emerging 
market countries and maintain political consensus on sound economic policy. This, after 
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A Model of Sectoral Employment and Wage Response to Exogenous Shocks 
 
 
A.1 Adjustment to External Financial Shock 
 
Suppose a simple aggregate model of the dependent open economy along the lines of the World 
Bank RMSM model (see Agenor and Montiel, 1995). The real exchange rate (e) is defined in 
terms of the relationship between trade and non-traded prices (P t , Pnt ) in the usual way, where 










= =            Eqn 1 
 
Exports (X) in real (eg ‘dollar’) terms depend on the real exchange rate 
 
e x x X . 1 0 + =             Eqn 2 
 
Imports depend on the real exchange rate and the level of domestic activity (Y) 
 
Y m e m m M 2 1 0 . + + =           Eqn 3 
 
The authorities’ task is to ensure that the trade balance (ie X – M ) is kept in line with net capital 
inflows (F), themselves composed of official and private net flows plus changes in reserves 
 
F M X = -             Eqn 4 
 
Substitution of [2] and [3] into [4] allows us to express the level of activity (Y) in terms of the 
real exchange rate (e) and the level of capital flows (F). 
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Y - + - + =       Eqn 5   
 
Obviously, if there is a capital outflow associated with a financial crisis (ie F falls) then either Y 
must decline too in order to restore equilibrium (eg through a large cut in domestic credit and/or 
government expenditure) or the real exchange rate must be adjusted upwards – that is depreciated 
in the sense that non-traded prices must decline relative to traded prices.  
 














The role of the wage level in this adjustment process can easily be seen using the approach to the 
modelling of the real exchange rate set out in Dornbusch (1980).  World prices are of course 
exogenous, but domestic non-traded prices are formed by a markup (r) on costs composed of 
labour inputs (u) at the nominal wage rate (W) on the one hand, and imported inputs (m) at the 
traded price level on the other. 
 
] . . )[ 1 ( t nt P m W u r P + + =       Eqn 6 
 
Rearranging equations 16 and 17 yields a clear relationship between the real wage and the real 
exchange rate. The higher (ie more depreciated) the real exchange rate, the lower will be the real 











=         Eqn 7 
 
In consequence, there is a clear trade-off between the level of wages and the level of activity in 
the adjustment mechanism. To adjust to a given external financial shock (ie change in F) one or 
the other must be shifted. If for simplic ity (but see below) we take total employment (L) to be 
proportional to the activity level (Y) so that   
 
) ( .. e Y L l =           Eqn 8 
 
Then the same is obviously true of the trade off between the level of wages and the level of 
employment.  If employment is to be stabilised, then the real exchange rate (and thus the real 
wage rate) must be used as a policy instrument.  
 
However, this assumes a single wage rate and an unsegmented labour market. In reality there are 
a number of employment sectors and although the impact of financial crisis is initially felt in the 
‘modern’ corporate sector of banks and companies, the rest of the economy soon feels the 
consequences. To these labour market impacts we now turn. 
 
 
A.2 Equilibrium in the Segmented Labour Market 
 
Consider an economy with a labour force (L) allocated between three sectors – the Corporate and 
Government Sector (1), the Urban Informal Sector (2), and the Rural Peasant Sector (3).  As there 
is no unemployment insurance, there is no open unemployment either. 
3 2 1 L L L L + + =          Eqn 9 
Employment and wages (Ll, wl ) in the CGS are set exogenously, and will of course respond to 













the UIS is determined by the shares (á, â) of the wagebill and profits in the CGS) respectively; 
these profits are determined by a markup, r, on the wagebill. 
1 1 1 1 1 1 ] [ ) 1 ( w L r w L r w L B b a b a + = + + =     Eqn 10 
And this expenditure determines total income (wages times employment) in the UIS 
sector.  
B L w = 2 2         Eqn 11 
 
At equilibrium, the wage (or income) levels in the UIS and RPS are equalised by migration. 
Workers migrate into the cities to provide UIS goods and services, increasing the labour force 
(L2) and, for the given expenditure (B), driving down average incomes (w2 ) .  A frictional 
‘wedge’ between the two wage levels could be introduced, but would not affect the results.  
3 2 w w =         Eqn 12 
Finally, RPS incomes are determined by the amount of labour in the sector, because total 




w =          Eqn 13 
Substituting as appropriate in order to eliminate B yields solutions for the levels of employment 
and wages in the UIS and RPS in terms of wages and employment in the CGS sector:  
1 1
1






























=       Eqn 17 
 
 
A.3 The Impact of Exogenous Shocks to Corporate Sector Labour on the Rest of the Labour 
Market 
 
We can now derive the respective response elasticities (R) with respect to the (exogenous) 
changes in L1 and w1. As we shall see, the effects of wage and employment changes in the 
corporate sector are different. To the extent that, as is argued in the text, the welfare effects on 
children of household unemployment are different to, and probably worse than, changes in 
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L L E       Eqn 19 
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